Background Consolidation is often considered by policymakers as a means to reduce service delivery costs and enhance accountability. Objective The aim of this study was to estimate the potential cost savings that may be derived from consolidation of local health authorities (LHAs) with specific reference to the Italian setting. Methods For our empirical analysis, we use data relating to the costs of the LHAs as reported in the 2012 LHAs' Income Statements published within the New Health Information System (NSIS) by the Ministry of Health. With respect to the previous literature on the consolidation of local health departments (LHDs), which is based on expost-assessments on what has been the impact of the consolidation of LHDs on health spending, we use an ex-anteevaluation design and simulate the potential cost savings that may arise from the consolidation of LHAs.
Introduction
In recent years, health spending has grown faster than the gross national product in many OECD countries. Especially in the years preceding the economic crisis, health spending outpaced the rest of the economy, with an annual average growth of 3.8% [1] . Even though reform efforts have slowed this trend, unless there are major changes in healthcare policy, the pressure of health spending on public-sector budgets is likely to grow further in the years ahead. Indeed, the cost and increasing us of medical technology and the ageing of the population may further contribute to spiralling healthcare costs. The financial crisis, large government deficits and austere public spending policies have imposed a tight budget constraint on healthcare systems, putting great emphasis on the necessity of considering organisational restructuring among health providers that are aimed at controlling, or even cutting, health expenditures.
In accordance with the general OECD trend, health expenditure in Italy has steadily increased over time, especially in the years before the economic crisis. Between 2000 and 2009, public healthcare spending grew constantly (from 5.63% of GDP to 8.03%), exceeding the GDP growth rate and making its containment a major political issue. Due to cuts and cost-containment measures, healthcare spending has gradually diminished, remaining relatively constant at a level below that prior to the economic crisis (6.8% of GDP) [1, 2] . 1 In order to place stricter control over public healthcare expenditure, major reforms initiated in the 1990s have led Italy to experience not only a process of decentralisation, which has seen a progressive shift of jurisdiction in the health domain from the centre to the Regions, but also a process of managerialism. Managerialism, in line with the 'New Public Management' that inspired a European agenda of administrative reforms, shifted the Italian healthcare administration from a politico-representative type to a technical-managerial administration [3] . Specifically, managerialism changed local health authority (LHA) status from public bodies to self-managing, independent public enterprises, administered by managers appointed by regional governments and characterised by an increased accountability.
In order to respond to the financially driven agenda of reducing budget deficits, economies of scale were also sought by reducing the number of LHAs [3] [4] [5] . Indeed, the Italian National Health Service (NHS) was interested in a reorganisation process characterised by the frequent merging of LHAs over smaller ones [6] . This process has continued in recent years: The basic idea is that consolidation of existing LHAs into a smaller number of much larger LHAs may lead to minimising administrative overlaps and to delivering efficiency gains.
Previous studies that investigate the relationship between consolidation of local health departments (LHDs) and public health spending showed mixed results. Borcherding and Deacon [7] and Santerre [8] estimated the demand for public health services, using a cross-national and a Connecticut sample, respectively, and found that population size has no impact on per capita public health spending. Gordon et al. [9] examined LHD expenditures and their relationship to several departmental characteristics, including the size of the population in the department's jurisdiction. They showed an inverted U-relationship between population and per-capita health expenditure.
More recent studies have supported the idea that the consolidation of LHDs may reduce service delivery costs and increase the efficiency of public health services. Bates and Santerre [10] contributed to the empirical literature by examining the consolidation of a set of district health departments in Connecticut. They found that a 1% increase in population size resulted in a 1.6% decline in public health spending per capita. Santerre [11] used a nationally representative sample of American LHDs to investigate the relationship between population size and local public health spending. His findings suggested that economies of scale achieved through health department consolidation may improve the cost-effectiveness of service provision. Mays et al. [12] and Hoornbeek et al. [13] also reported evidence of cost savings and other benefits such as improving the performance of essential health services. Hoornbeek et al. [14] examined the effects of LHD consolidations on total and administrative expenditures in Ohio. They found that the consolidation of LHDs might lead to a reduction in total expenditures, but not to a statistically significant change in administrative expenses.
The aim of this study was to estimate the potential cost savings that may be derived from LHA consolidation in Italy. Since the major intent of the policy makers is to preserve the level of health services, we focused specifically on scale economies with reference to a particular subset of the production cost of LHAs, i.e. administrative costs together with the purchasing costs of goods (such as 1 According to ISTAT [2] , the healthcare expenditure in 2016 was equal to 149,500 million euros, 75% of which was financed by the public sector and the rest by the private sector, mainly in the form of out-of-pocket (OOP) payments. In Italy, healthcare is delivered mainly by public providers. The total amount of the public health expenditure is annually defined according to the national budget constraints: the central level-represented by both the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Finance-ensures that the regions keep their healthcare expenditure within their budgets and guarantees the essential levels of care. There is not an official target for the ratio of total public health expenditure over GDP. drugs and medical devices) as well as non-healthcare-related services (non-medical services). We assessed the economic effects of a consolidation policy under the assumption that all production factors used directly in the provision of healthcare services (in particular the medical and nursing staff) remain constant, i.e. the actual level of healthcare delivered to the population remains unchanged.
The choice of focusing on this specific type of costs is also motivated by the fact that, from preliminary estimates, it emerged that the per capita total production cost depends neither on the LHAs' demographic dimensions nor on other socioeconomic variables due to particular features of the Italian NHS. Indeed, the organisational structure of the Italian NHS consists of three levels: the Central Government, the Regions and LHAs. The Central Government is responsible for national health planning, ensuring equal healthcare coverage throughout the country [15] . The Central Government provides annual financial transfers to the Regions using a procedure based on a weighted capitation formula involving population size and age structure. Next, the financial transfers are disbursed by each region to its LHAs using similar methods [4, [15] [16] [17] . LHAs have to keep within their budget and are almost totally financially dependent on their Regional Government's financial transfers. Therefore, the per capita total production cost tends to be quasi-exclusively explained by the financial transfers disbursed from each region to its LHAs.
For our empirical analysis, we used data relating to the costs of the LHAs as reported in the 2012 LHAs' Income Statements published within the New Health Information System (NSIS) by the Ministry of Health [18] . On the basis of these data, administrative costs together with the purchasing costs of both goods and non-healthcare-related services made up 18.2% of LHAs' total production cost. With respect to the previous literature on the consolidation of LHDs, which is based on ex-post-assessments on what has been the impact of the consolidation of LHDs on the health spending, we use an ex-ante evaluation design and simulate the potential cost savings that may arise from the consolidation of current LHAs.
We are not aware of empirical studies about the economic effects of consolidation in the health sector concerning the Italian NHS. Our research intends to fill this gap in the literature. This type of analysis may be of particular interest to policymakers, especially at this stage of the radical restructuring effort, where few empirical investigations have been conducted.
The Merging Process Over Recent Decades
The Italian NHS is a Beveridge-like healthcare service, funded through general taxation. It was established in 1978 to replace a Bismarckian system of health insurance funds, with the declared goal of providing uniform and comprehensive healthcare services across the country [4, 16, 17] . Since its inception, the NHS has been heavily reformed: as healthcare expenditure increased steadily over time, the Central Government repeatedly introduced policy reforms aimed at controlling such growth. In particular, in the last 20 years major reforms have transformed the centralised structure of the Italian NHS through a process of decentralisation, with a progressive shift in responsibilities, management and funding from central to regional jurisdictions [19] .
With the 1990s' health reform, LHAs were transformed into independent public enterprises. Regional Governments achieved greater control over LHAs by appointing their own general managers and providing them with guidelines. Regions were also expected to cover LHA deficits. Larger hospitals, which had certain prerequisites (e.g. were of inter-regional or national importance; organised on a departmental basis; had an emergency department), were allowed to be independent from the LHAs and be considered public independent hospitals (Aziende Ospedaliere, AO) by taking on the legal form of a hospital enterprise with their own managing board. The other hospitals that did not meet the requirements were directly managed by LHAs (Presidi Ospedalieri, PO). With regard to hospital care, the providers in the public healthcare system ranged from hospitals that were directly controlled by the LHAs to public hospitals formally independent from the purchasers and private firms that can compete with the public ones for supplying services. This rearrangement was the basis for the introduction of competition within the Italian NHS and, to some extent, with private providers [4, 20, 21] . As a result of the 1990s' reforms, the Regional Governments coordinate and control the LHAs as well as public and private accredited hospital activity. 2 Each LHA organises and plans the healthcare systems for a specific area to provide services in the community closer to where people live and to ensure the achievement of essential levels of care (Livelli Essenziali di Assistenza, LEA).
The healthcare reforms also changed the structure of the NHS, which entailed a drastic reduction in the number of LHAs during the 1990s, falling from 659 in 1992 to 197 in 2001 [5] . Since then, the territorial reorganisation has continued, albeit less drastically. Indeed, as The merging of LHAs seems tightly linked with Central Government efforts to contain costs, especially through policies aimed at increasing the efficiency of public spending. Of the 58 LHAs that were merged between 2001 and 2015, as many as 32 of them are indeed located in Regions under the Recovery Plan. Indeed, in order to prevent the financial failure of regional health systems in some Regions, the Central Government has introduced a special regime, the so-called 'Recovery Plan,' in an attempt to place stricter control over Regions' healthcare spending [22] . However, even the most diligent of Regions have merged or are in the process of merging their LHAs. Emilia Romagna is one of these and has just recently merged four LHAs, creating one of the largest LHAs in Italy. In Tuscany, in 2015, a Regional Health Reform Bill was passed to reform the Regional Health Service by merging 12 LHAs into just three. In Lombardy, too, a recent Regional Health Reform Bill envisages the reduction of 15 LHAs to eight. 3 The merging of LHAs has been particularly evident in some metropolitan areas such as Rome and Milan. In Rome, there were eight LHAs until 2015 that have become six in 2016. In Milan, the Regional Law n. 23 of 11 August 2015, has transformed the pre-existing four LHAs in the new Health Protection Agency (Agenzia Tutela della Salute, ATS). In the Veneto Region, the merging process, which was started in 2017, will lead to only nine LHAs from the previous 21 LHAs.
This consolidation process has seen an organisational model emerge where the size of LHAs has reached a provincial dimension (in Italy, there are about 100 provinces, which are sub-regional administrative authorities) and, in some cases, regional. Apart from a few major metropolitan areas whose territories are subdivided into various LHAs, across the rest of the country the LHAs' user base often coincides with the provincial one.
The way in which LHAs are distributed by population size is anything but uniform. As can be seen in Fig. 1 , most LHAs (90, i.e. 62% of the total) have a user base of less than 400,000 inhabitants. There are, however, a significant number of LHAs with a user base of 400,000-600,000 inhabitants (30, i.e. 20.6% of the total). In contrast, there are five LHAs with less than 100,000 inhabitants (three of them in Veneto) as well as 11 (in Lombardy and Campania) with more than one million users. Some statistics regarding the dimensions of the LHAs are shown in Table 5 in the Appendix.
Methods

Economies of Scale in Local Health Authority (LHA) Production
In order to obtain estimates of the economies of scale in administrative costs and in the purchasing costs of goods and non-healthcare-related services, we estimated three different expenditure functions, each of which is specified using the following log-linear regression model:
The dependent variable C h is the per capita cost for the h-th LHA. The LHA's population, pop h , was set as an explanatory variable for exploring whether LHA size (in terms of number of inhabitants) would affect the healthcare per capita expenditure for the examined cost type. We used a quadratic function of population in order to comply with the theory of economies of scale (U-shaped curve). This approach can capture a wide range of scale effects, such as the one in which per capita costs fall initially, but then rise after some threshold number of inhabitants. x hk is a vector of K explanatory variables and z hd is a vector of D dummy explanatory variables that capture LHAs' fixed characteristics. b 1 ; b 2 ; c k and d d are the parameters to be estimated; e h reflects the error term.
The data relating to the costs of LHAs were gathered from the 2012 LHAs' Income Statements published within the New Health Information System (NSIS) by the Ministry of Health. A key characteristic of the NSIS is that it standardises the type and format of economic data collected across Italy's regional health systems. Italy comprises 15 ordinary statute regions and five special statute regions, which have greater fiscal autonomy and legislative powers in all subject matters that are not expressly covered by national legislation. Special statute regions (indicated with an asterisk in Table 1 ) cannot be directly comparable with those of the other regions. Hence, in order to make the sample more uniform, the analysis focused on those 119 LHAs that belong to Regions with an Ordinary Statute (ROS).
Data concerning the dependent variable was defined according to the disaggregation of the published Income Statements:
• The 'administrative costs' include the cost for 'administrative personnel' with either a permanent or a fixedterm contract, as well as 'other operational costs' including allowances, expenses and social security contributions for governing bodies and statutory auditors.
• 'Cost of goods' includes both the cost of buying health goods (drugs, medical devices, dietary products, Dimensional class -population in thousands (2012) chemicals, etc.) as well as non-health goods (foodstuffs, cleaning products, fuel, etc.).
• 'Non-health services buying costs' include laundry, cleaning, catering, heating, waste disposal, insurance premiums and consultancy fees.
The first part of Table 6 in the Appendix includes descriptive statistics of the aforementioned costs. The 119 LHAs belonging to ROSs have an average annual per capita cost of €40.9, €183.2 and €91.3 for administrative costs, the cost of goods and non-health-services buying costs, respectively. The high value of the variation coefficients and the noticeable difference between the minimums and the maximums do, however, highlight the significant variability between the LHAs' per capita costs. In aggregate, these costs amount to €15.9 billion and represent 18.2% of LHAs' total production costs. Administrative costs constitute the lowest share (2.4%), while the purchasing of goods and non-health services constitute 10.6 and 5.3% of total production costs, respectively.
An important aspect for our purposes is the relationship between the per capita costs and the demographic dimension of the LHAs. Figure 2 shows that the per capita value for the three types of costs considered tends to decrease as the LHA's resident population grows. In particular, it can be seen how in the larger LHAs (those with a population of over one million), the per capita cost turns out on average to be approximately 52.8% less than that of the smaller LHAs (of up to 200,000 inhabitants) for goods; for administration this figure is 48.3% less, and 38.3% for nonhealth-services purchases.
The definition of the control variables and the related descriptive statistics are included in Table 6 in the Appendix. Since many demographic and socioeconomic variables at the LHA level are not available in a specific national database, in order to capture these characteristics, it was necessary to reconstruct the data of each LHA by using the municipal data published by the National Institute of Statistics (ISTAT). By means of a special table that links Municipalities to LHAs provided by the Ministry of Health, it was possible to determine the surface area and the population density covered by the LHAs, the number of Municipalities, demographic structure indices such as the ageing index, the elderly dependency index, the structural dependency index and the percentage of foreigners. An analogous procedure was used to reconstruct per capita income in each of the LHAs starting from the Municipalities data on taxable income of each municipality published by the Ministry of Home Affairs.
Among the control variables, the per-capita lump-sum funding received from the Regional Governments deserves the most attention. The regional lump-sum funding received by LHAs represents 97.4% of the total production costs of the health service provided to resident citizens [18] , and it represents the most important exogenous variable that LHA managers have to contend with. The control variable data on staff, facilities and activities were taken from the National Health Service database. A number of LHAs and hospital indicators are part of this category (e.g. medical staff, hospital beds, number of days in-hospital, number of patients receiving integrated home care). Data were also collected on all the following services: Unified Reservation Centres; the Addiction Treatment 200-400 400-600 600-800 800-1.000 >1.000
Cost of goods Non-health services costs Administrative costs Service; the Departments of Preventative Medicine, Mother-Child Clinics, and Mental Health, transport to dialysis centres; Mobile Resuscitation Units; and ambulances for the emergency transport of new-born babies. Data on community care were gathered taking into consideration the number of general practitioners, paediatricians, emergency medical service stations (and of emergency medical service hours) and the number of prescriptions.
Regional differences in the organisation of the Health Service and the consequential effects on administration costs were evaluated using binary variables. The regional dummies were defined bearing in mind that the Regional Health Systems can vary according to the extent to which public independent hospitals and accredited private hospitals are involved in the delivery of health services. According to Brenna [21] and Mapelli [23] , as regards the creation of public independent hospitals and the role of the accredited private hospitals, the Regions have adopted different strategies from which four different models have emerged: the integrated model, the semi-integrated model, the semi-separated model and the separated model.
In The only region that falls into this category is Lombardy. Actually, in Lombardy, less than 1% of the hospitals are part of the LHA, and patients are free to select their providers (public or accredited private). Table 7 in the Appendix shows that the average costs depend significantly from the organizational model adopted by the regions.
Three different dummies were therefore defined, one for each organisational model, apart from the 'semi-separated' one. Within a specific regional model, different LHA models can coexist: integrated LHAs, separated LHAs and mixed LHAs. The integrated LHAs incorporate all the hospital healthcare centres. The direct opposite of this is the Lombardy model where the hospitals are totally separated from the LHAs. Lombardy is the only region that belongs to the separated LHAs model with a clear purchasing role of the LHAs: indeed, its organization of the health system is characterised by separation between purchasers and providers. Most hospitals have been taken out of LHA control and established as public independent hospitals. LHAs purchase services from public and private providers, while the region has a regulatory role.
Finally, the mixed LHAs are those where the hospital becomes an autonomous legal entity but at the same time retains some hospital healthcare centres. In order to account for the different level of integration of the LHAs, we also included among the control variables the amount of reimbursements to other LHAs, public independent hospitals and accredited private providers for health services (purchased health services). We also controlled for the amount of administrative costs faced by each LHA for consultancies, partnerships, temporary work and other labour costs in non-health areas expressed as a share of total production (purchased administrative services) and included a binary variable that indicates whether an LHA belongs to a Region under a Recovery Plan.
Finally, we included in our empirical model two dummy variables that take a value of one if the LHA is located in a Region with a centralised purchasing system (a central body in charge of handling the purchasing activity such as selecting contractors, negotiating prices and conditions, making purchasing decisions). Indeed, previous literature has shown that one way to reduce purchasing costs (other than consolidation) is to centralise the purchasing process, while a fully decentralised purchasing process, where procurement is managed at the local level, is associated with inefficiency and poor transparency [24, 25] . The first dummy (d_central) indicates whether the purchasing system concerns all sectors and the second (d_central_h) indicates whether the presence of a centralised purchasing system that concerns healthcare only.
In our model, we did not include input prices. With regard to the administrative costs equation, input prices are mainly made up of personnel costs. However, collective agreements tend to standardise working conditions and wages. Hence, the wage rates are the same in all LHAs. With regard to the goods and non-health-services costs equation, data on input prices are not available at the LHA and regional levels. Moreover, LHAs often buy goods and non-health services through the national procurement agency (Italian Central Procurement Agency, CONSIP), which is totally and directly owned by the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance and designed to buy goods and services for the Public Administration through standardised purchase orders. Equation (1) was calculated using ordinary least squares (OLS), with robust standard errors and by using the stepwise backward elimination technique (at a 5% level of significance). We started with all the predictors in the model, and backward stepwise regression was used to arrive at a more parsimonious model. The variable that is least significant (i.e. the one with the largest p value) is removed and the model is refitted. Each subsequent step removes the least significant variable in the model until all remaining variables have individual p values 0:05. This follows a 'general to specific' method of model building commonly used in econometrics [26] . The variance inflation factor (VIF) index was used to test collinearity. Some of the more problematic (VIF index [ 10) predictors were removed. Goodness of fit and predictive power were measured using the adjusted R 2 index, and Akaike's information criterion (AIC).
Ex-ante Simulation of LHA Consolidation Policies
With reference to the expenditure functions estimated in the previous Section, we employ an ex-ante evaluation design to simulate the potential resulting cost savings that may arise from the consolidation of current LHAs. Savings calculations were made along the same lines as those of Harrison [27] and Rizzi and Zanette [28] . We assume that N initial LHAs (h ¼ 1; . . .; N) are merged into M new larger ones (j ¼ 1; . . .; M). With each new j-th LHA that emerges from the consolidation of n j old LHAs (with P M j¼1 n j ¼ N), the potential saving (S j ) is modelled as:
Equation (2) defines the difference between the sum of costs of the pre-merger LHAs and the cost of LHA j resulting from the merger event. C i and pop i are the per capita costs and the population of the pre-merger LHAs, respectively, while C j and pop j indicate those values for newly formed LHAs. Since the value of C j is unknown ex ante, it is not possible to compute the potential S j that may be obtained from the consolidation. Therefore, we use expected costs rather than actual costs to evaluate cost savings:
where b C i is the fitted values of the estimated equations. The values of b C j are calculated by using the estimated equations and the values of control variables that resulted from the aggregation of the original LHAs. 4 In order to evaluate the potential effects of merging, two different policies were simulated:
• The first policy (minimum consolidation policy) assumes that only smaller LHAs are merged, and in particular those that are within the first distribution quartile with respect to resident population. We assumed that consolidation programmes affected neither the quantity nor the quality of the health service provided. This assumption reflects politicians' desire to ensure that individuals receive the same level of healthcare services. It should be added here that institutional constraints do not allow changes in medical staff numbers. This implies that the cost of the most important part of the health service (hospitals and local health services) remains constant even after merging. In view of this, an improvement in the efficiency of the health system can only be obtained in the administrative sector or in the purchasing of goods and non-healthcare-related services.
Once the new LHA territories were defined, the expected cost per capita for each LHA was estimated for each of the aforementioned three types of outlays according to the previously calculated expenditure functions. The expected savings for each single aggregation and for the overall merger policy was then calculated based on Eq. (3).
Results
The results of the regression model are included in Table 2 , which also contains the eliminated potential predictors. As a sensitivity analysis, we reran the model with a less stringent p value of B 0.10 to allow for the presence of variables that may be relevant with respect to the hypotheses being tested. This variant did not significantly affect the results that remained, similar to those presented in the paper.
Econometric analysis highlights economies of scale linked to the population size of the LHA. Indeed, the estimated coefficients reported in Table 2 show that the per capita costs considered in this analysis tend to decrease as the demographic size of the LHA grows. The elasticity of administrative per capita cost with respect to population is -2.50, and with regard to goods and non-health-service costs are -0.112 and -0.127, respectively. All things being equal, this indicates that the increase in the demographic size of the LHA could result in a reduction in costs. This finding is supported by the downward trend of the lines shown in Fig. 3 , displaying how, for the three activities considered, Ceteris paribus, per capita costs are much higher for the smaller LHAs than for the larger ones. The results are in line with other previous analyses (see, for instance, Santerre [11] ). As expected, a higher level of separation between purchasers and providers is associated with lower LHA expenditure for goods and service and lower administrative costs; indeed, the coefficients for the regional separated model and the variable that measures the amount of reimbursements to other LHAs, public independent hospitals and accredited private providers for health services, are always negative and statistically significant. The simulation results concerning the two consolidation policies described in Sect. 2.2 are given in Tables 3 and 4 .
As far as the minimum consolidation policy is concerned (Table 3) , the number of LHAs decreases from 119 to 75. Savings in the cost of goods are expected to amount to €211 million (9.4% of total actual cost of goods), €110 million in the non-health-services costs and €94 million in administrative costs. On aggregate, such a policy would allow for €416 million of cost savings, i.e. a 2.02% average reduction in the total production costs of LHAs. At the regional level, estimated savings would range from a minimum of 1.16% of total costs in Lombardy to a maximum of 4% in Tuscany.
On the other hand, the savings from the general consolidation policy would be far more substantial (Table 4) , as there would be just 47 LHAs. Since in this scenario almost all LHAs are involved in the merger, savings would amount to €1.55 billion, equal to a reduction of 2.15% with respect to total LHA production costs. The results obtained also indicate that not all consolidations are beneficial to the same extent. The greatest savings can be found in those regions characterised by a more integrated model such as the new LHAs in Calabria, Tuscany, Umbria (semi-integrated) and Veneto (integrated). Here, savings could exceed 3% of the total health service production cost. Again, savings seem to be more limited in Lombardy, the only example of a separated model.
Discussion and Conclusions
Many mergers and reconfigurations of Italian LHAs have taken place in recent years, with important changes in the structure of the NHS. In our paper, we performed a crosssectional analysis using a prospective evaluation design to derive estimates of the potential cost savings that may arise from consolidation of LHAs. The analysis focuses only on costs not directly related to the provision of healthcare services, such as administrative costs, cost of goods and non-health-service costs. Therefore, the assessment of the effects of consolidation policies is made under the hypothesis that the quantity and the quality of health services remain unchanged.
Our results demonstrate the existence of economies of scale linked to the population size of the LHA; the decision to reduce the number of LHAs may result in bigger local health authorities that are more cost-efficient. The largest savings may be obtained with the general consolidation policy, which allows savings of €1.55 billion, i.e. 2.15% of total costs, as the consolidation process involves a larger number of LHAs.
The estimated coefficients indicate that the per capita administrative costs reach a minimum when the LHA is characterised by approximately 1,572,000 inhabitants, whereas the per capita costs of goods and the non-healthservices costs do not show a minimum, as the coefficients of log(pop) 2 are not significant for these costs. Consequently, there are not strong indications for policy makers about the LHA optimal dimension. In the relevant dimension range, all per capita costs considered in the analysis decrease steadily as the population size increases. The costeffectiveness of a consolidation depends on the size of the LHAs involved too and on the transitional costs. If the original LHAs are already large, cost savings tend to be quite small and the gain achieved from the exploitation of economies of scale could be counteracted by transitional costs. For smaller LHAs, on the other hand, the advantages of economies of scale could prevail since their per capita cost decreases rapidly.
Actually, mergers of LHAs usually involve a significant reorganisation of resources and activities. The main transitional costs are related to human resources management, space alteration, information system harmonization and equipment reallocation. This means that plans for a merger must make financial provision for instance for early retirement and staff relocation and retraining. These costs are among the first incurred as a merger is implemented.
Transitional costs and expenditure reduction cannot, however, be compared directly because the former occur only once, while the latter recurs every year. To make the comparison it is necessary to discount the cash flow of expected savings. For instance, the discount value of overall costs savings for 20 years at a 3% rate is equal to €6 billion with the minimum consolidation policy (Table 3) and €23 billion with the general consolidation policy (Table 4) . These amounts represent the maximum level of transitional costs that policy makers could afford in order to approve the reforms.
Even though the economies of scale that are derived from consolidation of LHAs may be partly offset by transitional costs, they may be an important driver in limiting the large and growing cost of healthcare, and may be used to improve the quality of healthcare; for instance, making more resources available for R&D, while maintaining the level of service in terms of quality and distribution as well [29] .
We acknowledge that the results of our analysis are affected by two limitations. The first limitation concerns the cross-sectional nature of our analysis that makes it impossible to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Since data on demographic and socioeconomic characteristics at the LHA level are not available in a specific national database, we reconstructed these data by means of a special table that links municipalities to LHAs provided by the Ministry of Health, through which it was possible to determine the surface area and the population density covered by the LHAs, the number of municipalities, demographic structure indices such as the ageing index, the elderly dependency index, the structural dependency index and the percentage of foreigners. An analogous procedure was used to reconstruct per capita income in each of the LHAs. However, the number of municipalities for each single LHAs tend to vary from one year to another and the number of LHAs in some regions also tend to vary from one year to another, and this makes it difficult to construct a panel dataset.
Another major difficulty we encountered in the estimation of the empirical model was selecting significant relevant variables, in a topic where no robust theoretical indications emerge about the selection of regressors. Bearing in mind the principle of parsimony, a reasonable criterion to estimate the potential economies of scale, which may derive from the consolidation policies of LHAs, is the stepwise analysis. Such an approach has the advantage that it provides a choice among the regressors on the basis of an optimality criterion. The use of stepwise, however, might causes biases due to the elimination of marginally significant variables. Future research would benefit from relevant theoretical works on the consolidation policies of LHAs.
Despite these limitations, the findings of our study provide practical insight into the concerns and challenges of LHA consolidations and may have important implications for NHS organisation and for the containment of public healthcare expenditure.
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